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1 Key research questions
The past 500 years of global history have been
characterised by changing patterns of global
dominance. In the late sixteenth century, China
accounted for around 30 per cent of global gross
domestic product (GDP), compared with a share
of around 20 per cent for Western Europe and less
than 5 per cent for Japan; at that time, North
America barely featured as a production base
(Dahlman and Aubert 2001). During the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, Western Europe in general
(and the UK in particular) grew to dominate the
global economy, with their role being supplanted
from the late nineteenth century by the US.
From the late twentieth century, Asian
economies, with more than half of the global
population, began to play an increasingly important
role as global producers. This revival began in Japan
after the 1960s, and then spread to a limited number
of small and medium-sized East Asian economies
during the last quarter of the century. At the dawn
of the new millennium, the momentum of Asia has
been significantly strengthened by the very rapid
growth of two very large economies: China and
India, each with around 20 per cent of the global
population, have seen sustained rates of economic
growth exceeding 7 per cent annually. But it is not
just these two economies which underlie Asia’s
growing presence in the global economy. China in
particular is integrated into a regional system of
production involving a number of medium-sized
economies such as Thailand and Vietnam, and India
is actively beginning to pursue links with other
South Asian regional economies. We refer to these
newly dynamic and generally large Asian economies
as the Asian Drivers.
These Asian Drivers are likely to have a significant
impact on the global economy for three major
reasons. The first arises as a consequence of their
growing competitiveness, their size and their rapid
growth. This is reflected not just in their GDP and
share of global trade, but also in their command
over key strategic resources such as investment and
foreign exchange; together, for example, China and
India have foreign exchange reserves of more than
US$700bn. As a result, the Asian Drivers have a
non-marginal impact on a range of factor and
product markets.
The second way in which these newly dynamic
Asian economies will have an impact on the global
economy is as a result of their conduct as investors,
buyers and in institutions of global governance. In
many sectors, investors from the Asian Drivers are
beginning to play an important role in other
developing economies and in the coordination of
global production networks. Buyers located in these
newly dynamic economies are beginning to provide
new avenues for both existing and new products
sourced from other developing economies. Asian
Driver governments are already playing an
increasingly important role in shaping the global
economy. They participate actively in a variety of
“rules-making bodies” such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in discussion on global
climate change. It is likely that their roles in these
institutions will grow in importance as their
economic power strengthens further. It is also
possible that they may begin to play a particular
and distinctive role, perhaps developing positions
in opposition to the currently dominant views of
the North American and Western European
economies. It is not too fanciful to see the emergence
of what might be called a “Beijing Consensus”
running in some cases against the currently
hegemonic Washington Consensus, which
dominates the institutions of global (and often
national) governance. Finally, non-governmental
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actors from these economies are also beginning to
play a role in the rules governing private sector
economic interchanges, and in NGO-fora.
And, third, as a consequence of the impacts of
the Asian Drivers on the global economy, low-
income economies which previously saw their
future as lying in promoting North–South links,
are now increasingly looking towards Asia and/or
to their regions as sources of future dynamism.
There is increasing recognition of the growing
power of these Asian Drivers, reflected in all of the
major newspapers and financial journals. How will
the Asian Drivers use their foreign exchange
surpluses? Will they trigger a run on the dollar as
they switch into the Euro? How will the global
electronics industry be affected by the rise of Chinese
producers such as Lenovo (which recently took
over IBM’s PC division), or Huawei Technologies,
which has a rapidly growing presence in the supply
of global telecommunications networks? What
impact will India’s growing presence in the global
service sector have on white-collar and professional
employment in the high-income economies?
But in all this flurry of activity on the impact of
the Asian Drivers on the global economy, few are
asking the question: what impact will they have on
the developing world? This question is particularly
apposite given the commitment of the global
community to halve the incidence of global poverty
by 2015.
This article sets out the outlines of a globally
networked research programme. It provides answers
to five major sets of challenges posed to low-income
economies by the rise of the Asian Drivers:
1. What are the consequences for their economic
growth?
2. Who are likely to be the losers and winners from
the growing dynamism of the Asian Drivers,
within and between low-income economies,
and within and between regional clusters of low-
income economies?
3. Given these growth and distributional impacts,
what are the implications for development
strategies in developing economies?
4. How should developing countries engage with
the global economy in general, and the Asian
Drivers in particular?
5. Given their rapid growth and size, what are the
implications of this shift in global power for
institutions of local, national, regional and global
governance, in the public, private and non-
governmental sectors?
We begin this outline of a research programme
by focusing on a taxonomy of linkages through
which the Asian Drivers might affect developing
economies. We identify key knowledge gaps and
briefly establish the principles of a methodology
appropriate to answer the five central questions set
out above. We conclude by establishing the nature
of the network relations involved in this research
programme.
2 A taxonomy of impacts
We can identify four dominant vectors through
which the dynamism of the Asian Drivers has an
impact on growth and distribution in low-income
economies and regions:
●
Production and trade flows
●
Financial flows
●
Environmental spillovers
●
Global and regional governance.
There are a number of features which are
common to each of these vectors. First, the scope
of these impacts ranges from the micro-, through
the meso- to the macro-level. For example, following
the abolition of Multifibre Arrangement (MFA)
quotas, the potentially very rapid rise of Asian Driver
producers in the clothing sector affects individual
producers in other developing economies, groups
of producers (such as African exporters to the US
under the African Growth Opportunities Act
(AGOA) arrangements), and the structure of the
global textiles and apparel sector as a whole. Second,
these impacts may be both direct and indirect.
Indeed indirect effects may often have a bigger
impact on growth in developing countries than
more obvious but quantitatively less significant
direct effects. For example, although switches in
foreign exchange reserves by China and India may
directly only affect growth in the US and the EU,
they may have a significant indirect impact on the
capacity of other low-income economies to export
to these large markets. Third, low-income
economies are affected differentially by the
competitiveness and growth of the Asian Drivers.
In some cases, there may be complementary effects,
perhaps because producers in other economies
benefit from the demand for their outputs from the
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Asian Drivers, are included in regional value chains
or participate in joint-action in institutions of global
governance. In other cases, their interests may be
competitive, for example, when Asian Drivers
exclude other developing economies from access
to global markets or investment resources. Fourth,
although the four vectors represent different ways
in which the growth of the Asian Drivers can be
seen to affect other developing economies, they are
often interconnected. For example, foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows are closely linked to
changing patterns of global trade, and to the
clustering of economic activity which leads to
adverse environmental spillovers. And, finally, each
of these four vectors reflects not just flows of
resources, but also the exercise of power. China
and India not only command more than US$700bn
of foreign exchange resources, but have the capacity
to affect key exchange rates, especially with respect
to the dollar; China and India are not just exporters
of manufactures, but increasingly are host to
powerful firms with a growing global footprint.
2.1 Production and trade flows
In recent years, the Asian Drivers have seen a
significant increase in their share of global
production and trade. For example, between 1985
and 2000, China’s share of global manufacturing
value added grew from 1.4 to 7.0 per cent, and its
share of developing country manufacturing value
added from 10.2 to 29.3 per cent. During the same
period, its share of global manufactured exports
grew from 1.0 to 6.5 per cent, and from 7.6 to 24
per cent, respectively (UNIDO 2002). In
commodities, between 2000 and 2003, China’s
share of the increase in global demand for
aluminium, steel, nickel and copper was 76 per
cent, 95 per cent, 99 per cent and 100 per cent,
respectively (Kaplinsky 2005). Similar trends can
be discerned in many agricultural and service
sectors. India has seen a major increase in service-
sector exports and in agriculture, of the developing
country members of the Asian Development Bank;
12 are net food exporters and 22 are net food
importers (Wilson 2002).
The growing presence of the Asian Drivers in
global trade flows reflects a variety of value chains.
In some cases, exports take place within the
internalised operations of transnational corporations
(TNCs). In other cases, production and exports
arise from the presence of increasingly large,
dynamic and powerful firms with roots in Asian
Driver economies. Particularly in the case of China,
many sectors exports emerge from regional value
chains, involving coordinated production between
plants in different economies and resulting in
deepening regional integration. Thus, East Asian
intra-regional trade rose from 24 to 35 per cent
between 1985 and 2001 (Ng and Yeats 2003). Much
of China’s growth in manufactured exports,
especially in electronics, incorporates components
produced in surrounding economies (Lall and
Abaladejo 2004).
These regional value chains are examples of the
complementary effect of the growth of production
and trade in the Asian Drivers. So too is their
demand for inputs sourced from other low-income
economies; Brazilian iron ore and Argentinean soya
exports are expanding rapidly as a result of China’s
voracious demand for inputs. But at the same time,
the dynamism of production and exports from the
Asian Drivers has had significant competitive
impacts on other low-income countries. Their
growing competitiveness has squeezed product
prices in many sectors in which developing
countries participate; between 1988 and 2002, the
greater the share of China in EU imports, the more
likely that the prices of these products fell (Kaplinsky
2005). It has also resulted in many low-income
economies being squeezed out of final markets,
notably in the case of the global clothing sector in
those sub-sectors in which quotas have been
removed. Low income economies may also be
squeezed out of resource-input markets by rising
prices and the internalised value chains of Asian
Driver firms. For example, both Chinese and Indian
oil and gas companies are rapidly developing
production links in Asia and elsewhere to ensure
long-term supplies of energy, with unexplored
consequences, not just for the global supply-
demand balance, but for the access of other
developing countries to these inputs.
A striking recent feature of the growth of these
Asian Drivers is the growing power and presence
of their corporate sectors. Unlike many other
developing economies, exports from the Asian
Drivers are increasingly being driven by locally
owned firms. In many cases these firms have the
strategic drive to become significant global players
and are reluctant to be relegated to the role of
producing to the designs emanating from high-
income economies (a generally competitive and
The Impact of Asian Drivers on the Developing World
5
low-margin niche filled by many developing
economy firms). Hence, they are not only expanding
their external operations, for example, in energy,
in pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, in
software and in finance, but do so by becoming
foreign investors themselves, often in other
developing economies.
2.2 Financial flows
The impact of financial flows on other developing
economies resulting from the dynamism of the
Asian Drivers shows the importance of examining
indirect and macroeconomic factors. The magnitude
of the surpluses held by the Asian Drivers has meant
that they have a major impact on the trajectory and
stability of the global economy, with profound
implications for other developing economies. Since
the late 1990s, buoyant demand in the global
economy has been facilitated by the ability of the
US (and to some extent the UK) economy to act as
an engine of demand for global production. This
not only benefits the direct exports of low-income
economies to these current account-deficit
countries, but also to current account-surplus
economies whose surpluses arise from their trade
with the US (and the UK).
The manner in which the Asian Drivers choose
to handle these surpluses will have a major impact
on the trajectory of the global economy, both with
regard to the speed and nature of growth. Should
they, for example, move their assets out of the dollar,
this might have a range of direct effects (reducing
demand in the US) and indirect effects (making EU
exports less competitive). Unless growth is increased
significantly in other regions, this could imply a
large fall in low-income countries’ exports as well
as their growth. In turn, this might have a differential
impact on different groups of low-income
economies, and perhaps force the Asian Drivers to
become more inward-oriented, thereby
simultaneously raising their demand for imported
inputs and reducing competitive pressures in global
product markets. A related issue is whether the
Asian Drivers handle their currency reserves in ways
which might affect the volatility of currencies and
macroeconomic performance. In previous eras,
volatility has been particularly harmful to low-
income economies (Griffith-Jones et al. 2003).
Flows of productive capital are closely related to
production and trade flows. In part, this is through
FDI, in which TNCs internalise supply chains in
order to serve global markets or to meet the needs
of customers abroad. Here the Asian Drivers play a
significant role in the competition for funds; in recent
years China and Hong Kong have accounted for
more than one-third of total FDI flows to the
developing world. Also, as Asian Driver-based firms
expand their operations, they may become a source
of funds for other low-income economies and hence
build up a complementary relationship with other
developing economies. There is increasing evidence
that China in particular is beginning to invest heavily
in commodity production and related infrastructure
in developing economies.
However, financial flows within firms are not
the only source of capital available to expand
production. Portfolio flows have been an important
source of finance in some countries and sectors.
The magnitude and volatile nature of these flows
may have profound implications for other
developing countries. Here, too, the Asian Drivers
may play a combination of competitive and
complementary roles. Particularly if they liberalise
their capital accounts further, they may become an
attractive target for portfolio flows, that they partly
squeeze out other emerging economies from global
capital markets. On the other hand, when and if
domestic and regional financial markets are
sufficiently deepened (for example if Asian bond
markets are developed), then a higher share of
savings from Asian Drivers may remain in their own
economy or in other Asian countries, and less would
be channelled to the rest of the world, both
developed and developing.
2.3 Environmental externalities
The very rapid growth of the Asian Drivers has non-
marginal impacts on the environment. These
environmental impacts are not only evident within
these economies, but also spill over into surrounding
regional economies and, in the case of carbon
emissions, to the global economy and the biosphere.
Many low-income economies are thereby affected
both directly and indirectly by the environmental
externalities arising from the dynamism of the Asian
Drivers.
A major component of these negative externalities
is associated with energy, both in the use of carbon-
displacing energy, and also in pollution caused by
the physical transport of inputs, components and
products within the region, and in the region’s
external trade. The need for energy to fuel economic
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growth has, as observed above, been a major driver
in the growing external role played by (often state-
owned) firms in energy-surplus regional economies.
But it is also reflected in the realm of international
relations as the Asian Drivers strive to create an
environment to provide for the energy security which
has rapidly taken the place of the quest for food
security which dominated politics in earlier decades.
Partly as a consequence of this search for secure
energy supplies and partly because of the
environmental externalities of energy-intensive
growth, both India and China have begun to play
a lead role in the promotion of policy agendas to
minimise pollution, and in the development of
technologies to lessen their negative impact. This is
reflected, inter alia, in their participation in
institutions of regional and global governance.
Although energy is a significant component of
these spillovers, there is also a range of other
environmental externalities arising from the
dynamism of the Asian Drivers. For example, water
is becoming an increasingly scarce resource, and a
possible source of tension with surrounding
economies.
2.4 Global and regional governance
Overall, the tendency is for global governance to
become more complex, to have a greater impact on
domestic economies, and for the areas governed to
extend. The regulation of various forms of global
interchange, in production, trade, finance and the
environment, involves a wide range of institutions.
For example, the “governance” of global trade
increasingly extends beyond government-
determined regulations to those defined by private
and quasi-private institutions (Nadvi and Waltring
2004). Bodies such as the International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO), the Codex Alimentarus
Committee and the World Organisation for Animal
Health affect trade through standards setting; the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) regulates trade in endangered
species and intellectual property, which is also a
trade question and comes under the remit of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
The global governance of the financial sector is also
to an important extent carried out by “soft law”,
whereby ad hoc bodies such as the Basle Banking
Committee agree regulations that strongly influence
international bank lending including that to
developing countries and domestic bank lending
within almost all countries. At present, developing
countries are not represented at all on the Basle
Banking Committee.
The role played by the Asian Drivers in
institutions of global governance has the potential
to have major impacts on developing countries. In
some cases, this role has already been felt. The impact
of China on institutions of global governance was
made most visible at Cancun, where it lined up with
other leading developing countries (Brazil, South
Africa and India), in the formation of the G22. On
environmental issues such as climate change, these
four countries are grouped with Russia to define the
five most influential countries outside of the OECD,
each playing a key role in their regions. However,
generally, such as in the operations of the Basle
Banking Committee and in the deliberations of
industry-bodies such as the ISO, the Asian Drivers
do not yet have a distinctive voice. But, given their
growing size, they are likely to become increasingly
active actors in these institutional deliberations.
This growing presence can potentially have
significant impacts on other developing economies
in different ways. This depends upon whether the
role played by the Asian Drivers in institutions of
global governance reinforces or opposes the interests
of and positions taken by other low-income
economies. Already there are examples of these
effects. In some cases, the Asian Drivers have acted
in concert with other developing economies. For
example, India and China could be expected to
strongly support the production of generic drugs
and their export to developing countries, which
would be in the interest of African countries. But
in other cases we can anticipate a divergence of
interests, for example in relation to Special and
Differential Treatment in the WTO (IDS Bulletin
2003). It is likely that the abolition of MFA quotas
in the clothing sector will adversely favour China
and India at the cost of sub-Saharan African (SSA)
producers and this is likely to result in conflicting
positions in institutions of global governance. It is
also likely that China and India will adopt very
different positions in some of these negotiations,
with China probably being more likely to align itself
with northern positions than India.
3 Knowledge gaps
This Asian Drivers research programme addresses
a central knowledge gap: what impact will the
dynamism of the Asian Drivers have on other
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developing economies? Beneath this meta-question
lies a series of general and specific knowledge gaps.
There are three overarching general gaps which
this research programme addresses. The first relates
to the theoretical framework most appropriate to
understanding these issues. At one level, it is evident
that this will necessarily be interdisciplinary,
multidisciplinary and contextual, for the problems
are too complex to be reduced to a single discipline,
and the world is too heterogeneous for a single
theoretical framework. But there is another level of
theoretical challenge: does the rise of the Asian
Drivers allow for a coherent overall story on the
evolution of the global economy (as in World
Systems Theory and other approaches to global
political economy), or do we find ourselves in a
post-modernist world of contextualism and diverse
outcomes? What body of trade-theory or theories
explaining the functioning of capital markets best
enables an understanding of the issues under
investigation? To what extent does our historical
research trajectory (e.g. global value chain analysis),
help or hinder the understanding of the impact of
the Asian Drivers? A second overarching knowledge
gap concerns methodology. What methods are most
appropriate for analysing and unravelling these
complex developments in trade, production,
finance, the environment and global governance?
To what extent can modelling techniques be used
to examine such links? How should existing models
best be adapted for this purpose? And, third, there
are gaps in our knowledge concerning appropriate
policy responses. The significance of the likely
impact of the Asian Drivers on other developing
countries is such that it is unlikely that previous
policies will suffice. But what new policies are
required, what new forms of connectedness are
indicated between different elements of national
policy, in approaches towards institutions of global
governance, and in links with other groups of
developing economies?
There are also specific knowledge gaps in each
of the four vectors which provide the framework
for our assessment of the impact of the Asian Drivers
on developing economies. We offer some brief
examples as an indication of the richness of the
research agenda.
3.1 Production and trade flows
We know that the dynamic Asian economies have
emerged as leading producers and exporters in a
number of sectors. They have also become
important markets for the imports of various
products. We know that these developments are
leading to significant shifts in the prices and volumes
of traded commodities, manufactures and services.
These changes are coming about as a consequence
of the productivity and export dynamism of these
Asian economies as well as a result of their demand
for various raw materials.
What we do not know is how these processes
of change in trade flows and terms of trade are
affecting other developing countries. The impacts
could be both complementary and competitive. In
the former case, which countries and which sectors
are being drawn into Asian Driver value chains,
and who is coordinating this incorporation? Which
sectors and countries are gaining directly from the
demand of the Asian Drivers for inputs, or (more
problematically) indirectly from demand in
countries which are directly gaining from the
demand generated by the Asian Drivers? To what
extent are producers and consumers in other low-
income economies gaining from the price
competitiveness and appropriateness of products
sourced from the Asian Drivers? On the other hand,
trade flows from the Asian Drivers may be
competitive to the interests of other developing
economies. In which sectors and to what extent are
they being crowded out of key markets? In which
sectors and to what extent does the competitiveness
of the Asian Drivers force down global prices? Over
what time-horizon will these impacts be felt; if there
is a boom in the prices of some key commodities,
how durable will this increase in prices be? And
what are the likely consequences of the temporal
effects for the many countries in Latin America and
Southern Africa who are re-specialising in
commodity sectors?
Although part of the wider discussion on trade,
the changing distribution and organisation of global
production requires further analysis. We know that
in a number of sectors where the dynamic Asian
economies have emerged as leading global
exporters, manufacturers, traders and other private
actors are taking on new and enhanced roles in
determining the global division of labour, in
organising global value chains, and in undertaking
more value-added functions. What we do not know
is how extensive this is, in which sectors this is most
significant, how this is coming about and what
consequences arise for the structure and
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organisation of global production. Another aspect
of the knowledge gap in this area is the nature of
the regional dimension, especially within East Asia,
of production organisation and its consequence for
the regional division of labour and regional systems
of innovation. We also do not know how these new
Asian Drivers engage with aspects of global
governance, especially governance in the area of
public and privately regulated standards. Do the
Asian Drivers that organise global and regional
production systems act as standards-takers,
standards-setters or do they ignore the standards
agenda?
3.2 Financial flows
An analysis of the way in which the impact of the
Asian Drivers on financial flows affects other low-
income economies is particularly beset by the need
to take account of macro and indirect affects. While
the global economy has witnessed strong growth,
allowing for the growing outward orientation of
the Asian Drivers, it has done so in the context of
large trade imbalances. Growing savings and trade
deficits in the US are balanced by significant
surpluses among the Asian Drivers; within regions
there are also differential patterns of trade
performance (e.g. China runs a deficit with its
regional neighbours). These surpluses and deficits
respond to macroeconomic policies and are
accompanied by financial flows, many of which are
short term and volatile. But these deficits are also
unsustainable. Thus, one big knowledge gap is how
these imbalances will be resolved. What are the
alternative mechanisms of adjustment (e.g.
exchange rate realignment, interest rate policy)
required to reduce the fiscal deficit? What is the
timing and the speed of such adjustment? To what
extent will growth in other regions be able to
compensate for the contraction in the US? Who
might be the key actors, and what will the
implications be for other developing economies,
both within the East and South Asian regions, and
elsewhere? How will changes in these
macroeconomic policies spill over into trade flows?
If interest rates in the US increase significantly, how
will this affect developing countries especially those
with high levels of debt? How will it affect the
spreads they have to pay for their borrowing, their
capacity to service debts and the possible risk of a
currency crisis? What policy responses are
appropriate and effective in this world in which the
interests of the high-income economies are
paramount and in which low-income economies
generally have little voice, not least because many
of the key decisions are made in the private sector
or in the limited fora such as the G7?
These macroeconomic policies have important
implications for financial flows. Here there are a
range of important knowledge gaps. If the Asian
Drivers are to redirect their surpluses away from
the dollar, might these surpluses be made available
to other developing countries, and if so, to which?
What prerequisites of development of local or
regional financial markets would have to be met?
Another dimension of financial flows are those
available to fund investment. What impact might
the Asian Drivers have on global portfolio flows?
Will their dynamism divert these flows from other
developing economies, or from particular groups
of developing countries, and through which
mechanisms? Or, might they be complementary,
perhaps more so in the case of regional economies?
What structures in the financial markets lead to
different outcomes in portfolio flows?
Another important set of financial flow is FDI.
We know that the Asian Drivers are sourcing from
other developing countries, we also know that they
are emerging in some sectors as leading foreign
investors in other developing countries. We do not
know yet how extensive and widespread this is, how
this varies across sectors and what consequences
this has for local producers and workers within these
developing countries. In particular, how do firms
in other developing countries enter into global value
chains dominated by such Asian Drivers, and how
do they manage to upgrade within such chains? In
addition, in what ways is FDI by the dynamic Asian
economies linked into regional economies and
agglomeration gains, and to what extent is it driven
by trade regimes? And to what extent are FDI flows
from the Asian Drivers concentrated in resource-
and energy-based sectors?
3.3 Environmental spillovers
Unlike production, trade and finance where there
has been some preliminary thought on the ways in
which the dynamism of the Asian Drivers might
affect other countries, less attention has been given
to their potential environmental impacts,
particularly on other low-income economies.
We know that the rapid growth of the dynamic
East and South Asian economies is concentrated in
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the industrial sectors, and is thus materials-intensive.
As a consequence, it is leading to significant
environmental externalities, both within these
countries and globally. We know less about the
detailed nature of this environmental footprint,
beyond energy (where there has been research on the
possible extent and impact of carbon emissions); in
what other ways might these spillovers affect other
developing countries? Can we distinguish between
the direct and indirect effects? Will the production
of commodities for the Asian Drivers lead to
environmental degradation in the producing
countries? Which developing countries are most likely
to be affected? What, if any, are the poverty impacts
of these spillovers? And over what time-horizon might
these externalities be expected to emerge?
3.4 Global and regional governance
We know that the Asian Drivers have hitherto not
played a major role in institutions of global
governance, with the exception of some issues
within the framework of the WTO. However, we
also know that they are unlikely to sustain this
passivity, as reflected in ongoing discussions on the
reform of the UN Security Council. There is a
significant knowledge gap on whether this historic
passivity is reflected in less-visible institutions of
global and regional governance, particularly those
which do not involve high-level government-to-
government negotiations. There is also a significant
gap in understanding the key differences in the
approaches adopted by China and India in these
various institutions of governance.
Where the Asian Drivers have had a presence in
these various types of institutions, have they adopted
a common or similar position? Has their role been
complementary to, or competitive with the
negotiating stands of other low-income economies?
This knowledge gap points to our widespread
ignorance of the detailed workings in institutions
of global governance, a particularly important
problem, since in many cases, it is here that
outcomes are determined – “the devil lies in the
detail”. Why and how do the Asian Drivers work
to further their individual interests in global
institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and
IMF, the UN as well as more regional organisations?
How much weight will Asian Drivers place on
strengthening regional institutions and mechanisms
such as the Asian Development Bank or the Ching
Mai initiative in relation to increasing their role in
global financial institutions such as the IMF? How
do they develop collective interests especially in
regional institutions? What drives competitive and
complementary actions and how are these
moderated by the role played by key countries? To
what extent are issues of security – military, energy
and food security – affecting the development of
regional power blocs, not just in the East Asian
region, but in other developing economies? And
how do these security concerns reflect themselves
in each of the four vectors underlying this research
programme?
4 Methodology
Addressing these complex problems requires a
heterodox mix of methodologies. Some of these
may be common across different research questions
and in relation to different vectors of impact; others
may be specific to particular problems.
The methodological challenge is reflected in the
need for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary
research. Given the interconnected nature of the
vectors which we have identified, the analytical
framework cannot be reduced to economics, but
must of necessity involve an integration of
disciplinary perspectives and must include a
capability to analyse and understand environmental
and social factors, and power relations.
A further overarching methodological challenge
lies in the necessity of integrating micro-, meso-
and macro-levels of analysis. Too often these
analytical levels are considered in isolation. Thus,
for example, macro-models tend to be ignorant of
input-output and power relations at the micro-level
and hence despite being intellectually elegant,
provide weak insights into the real world. On the
other hand, many micro-analyses fail to provide
the capacity to generalise, and ignore fallacy of
composition problems.
Bearing in mind these needs for interdisciplinarity
and the integration of levels of aggregation, a
coherent research programme will need to:
●
Build on past trajectories of research. There is an
existing body of knowledge and analytical
techniques which can be used to carry the analysis
forward productively. For example, global value
chain analysis (developed over the past five years)
provides a creative and rigorous framework for
analysing global production networks (IDS
Bulletin 2001); economy-wide analysis drawing
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on CGE models using the Global Trade and
Analysis Project (GTAP) database provides a
framework for integrating these value chain
analyses into higher-level assessments of the
partial and general-equilibrium effects, and into
the regional impacts of Asian Driver growth which
is both competitive with, and complementary to
other low-income economies; past analyses on
exchange controls and currency volatility can be
used to assess not only the impact of alternative
ways in which the Asian Drivers may use their
exchange reserves, but also on the implications
for flows of portfolio funds and FDI.
●
Incorporate both quantitative and qualitative
data. Historical and qualitative case-study
analysis is vital for understanding the underlying
processes affecting the determinants of
production and trade flows, the trajectory of
Asian Driver firms and the workings of
institutions of regional and global governance.
On the other hand, the assessment of the general
consequences of these structural features requires
extensive data analysis. So, too, will it be
necessary to use macroeconomic models to chart
the indirect consequences of Asian Driver
dynamism on other low-income economies. The
analytical challenge is to ensure that as with the
micro-meso-macro interface, the qualitative and
quantitative discourses are analytically
integrated.
The Impact of Asian Drivers on the Developing World
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Notes
* The IDS Asian Drivers Team members are: David Evans,
Ricardo Gottschalk, Stephany Griffith-Jones, John
Humphrey, Jane Kennan, Raphael Kaplinsky, Sherman
Robinson, Hubert Schmitz and Christopher Stevens.
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